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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

THE STATE OF UTAH

BILL S. WOODY d.b.a.
Woody Drilling Co.
Plaintiff and Appellant

v.

No. 11732

BERT RHODES and
VAUGHN RHODES
Defendant and Respondent

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF
This is an action on a promissory note upon which
Judgement by Default was obtained and fourteen months
later the judgement was set aside and the matter dismissed.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower Court granted the defendant's motion to
set aside a judgement by default and also dismissed the
matter even though an answer had been filed by the defendant.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
of the order setting
. Plaintiff, Appellant, seeks
aside the Default Judgement or m the alternative an order
reversing the dismissal of the matter so that the case may
be tried on its merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff filed a complaint on a promissory note on
February 15, 1968 and on February 20, 1968 the sheriff
reported that he had served the defendant Vaughn Rhodes
by leaving him a copy of the Summons and Complaint
with Mrs. Vaughn Rhodes (See Sheriff's Return). An
attorney, James L. Wadsworth, from Pioche, Nevada,
wrote plaintiff's attorney and said he represented Vaughn
Rhodes and asked for a delay until April 1, 1968 in which
to plead. No pleadings were received from defendant
Vaughn Rhodes and his default was entered on April 1,
1968and Judgement by default was taken on April 2, 1968
and a copy of the judgement was mailed to Attorney
Wadsworth. (The action against Bert Rhodes was dismissed without prejudice since he was a non-resident of
Utah.)
According to Defendant Vaughn Rhodes on February
20, 1968 he did see the summons and complaint left with
his wife but he did not learn that judgement had been
taken until January 1969, at which time he contacted an
attorney. Over three months later on April 29, 1969 a
motion to set aside the default was filed together with an
Answer and Counterclaim. The motion was based on Rule
No. 55 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and defendant
Vaughn Rhodes asked for an order setting the matter for
trial.
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At the hearing on the motion on May 13, 1969, no
trstimony was presented in support of the motion but defendant offered what purported to be the summons served
on Mrs. Vaughn Rhodes which carried a notation that the
summons was served on "Bert Rhodes" the 20th day of
February, 1968.
On June 17, 1969 the District Court signed an order
setting aside the Default Judgement on the grounds that
the deputy sheriff erroneously wrote the wrong defendant's name on the summons left with defendant's wife and
thus failed to provide defendant with notice required
under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The District Court
also entered an order dismissing the matter even though
defendant had filed an Answer and Counterclaim and had
asked that the matter be set for trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE A DEFAULT JUDGEMENT ENTERED
MORE THAN ONE YEAR PRIOR TO THE TIME OF
FILING THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE ON THE
GROUNDS OF A DEFECTIVE PERSONAL SERVICE
OF SUMMONS.
Plaintiff concedes that the Utah rule with regard to
setting aside judgements obtained by default has been
liberally construed to the end that there may be trial on
the merits. But limitations of time have been established
where a motion is made under certain circumstances. (See
Rule 60 ( b ) ( 1 ) , ( 2), ( 3), and ( 4).)
That there should be some limitation of time is apparent from some background information in this case
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which is not now being cited as evidence, but only to show
a reason for a time limitation.
Here an out of state plaintiff comes to Utah to obtain
a judgement on a promissory note. In a country where it
is estimated that one-fifth of our population moves every
year, this is not an uncommon occurrence. Plaintiff recognized that in this particular case there may be a trial on
the question of consideration for the note and witnesses
were located and statements taken showing the completion of the work contracted for, the existence of an undisclosed principal who has a contractor's license under
which plaintiff is operating by agreement and similar matters. Suit is filed, but the defendant does not answer even
though defendant admits he received a copy of the summons and complaint and the sheriff's return is valid on its
face. Default Judgement is taken and as required by Rule
5 ( b) ( 1 ) a copy of the judgement is mailed to a person
purporting to be defendant's attorney.
In looking for assets on which plaintiff can enforce
judgement it appears that a homestead exemption may be
claimed if execution is issued immediately so plaintiff
decides to give defendant an opportunity to enlarge his
estate before judgement is collected. Since the judgement
is regular on its face and not void, nor has it been satisfied,
released or discharged, there appears to be no reason to
keep in touch with witnesses after expiration of the three
month period allowed for setting aside defaults on other
grounds.

Over a year after the judgement has been filed plaintiff is told defendant wants it set aside. Plantiff, who is
a non-resident, is unable to understand why a defendant
in Utah is given the right to wait until he perhaps decides
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to sell his real estate, so that no judgement can be enforced and then have a judgement set aside so that if Plaintiff
is able to prevail his judgement will be worthless. It seems that a diligent plaintiff should have some
date on which he can say his judgement is valid in absence
of a fraud upon the court or a void judgement where plaintitf has a lien on real estate.
Another reason for a time limitation on motions to set
aside default judgements is the running of the statute of
limitations. Or one might consider the situation under
the new Uniform Consumer Credit Code where heavy
penalitics arc imposed upon a lender for failure to make
proper disclosures. If default judgements can be set aside
without time limitation under the reasons listed in Rule
60( b) ( 1), ( 2), ( 3), or ( 4) the present time limitation
on retention of disclosure statements is extended from two
years to an indefinite time.
Of course the fact that the rule was enacted with a
time limitation should be reason enough for its enforcement. "Otherwise, the rule would not make much sense."
(Shaw v. Pilcher, 9 Utah 2d 222, 341 P2d 949.)
This case seems to clearly fall within the provisions of
Rule 60 ( b) ( 4). There is no question but that the sheriff's return shows service and that the Summons actually
served was in accordance with the provisions of Rule 4 ( j).
There appears to be no requirement in the rules that the
sheriff \\Tite the name of the person served on the summo11s and there was no evidence presented in the District
CDurt as to who or at what time the name of Bert Rhodes
was written on the summons. But since the lower court
held for defendant we must assume that the deputy sher-
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iff did write the brother's name on the summons when it
was handed to Vaughn Rhodes' wife and that this invalidated the personal service of the summons under Rule
( 4). This then is a case where for any cause the defend.
ant was not personally served, but this is not a case where
the defendant lacked actual notice that a complaint had
been filed in which he was named as a defendant. The
summons clearly indicated Vaughn Rhodes was a party
defendant and he admits that he saw the Summons in his
affidavit filed with his motion. The record shows a letter
from an attorney purporting to represent Vaughn Rhodes
indicating that an attorney was contacted. This then
seems to be a case which clearly would fall within Rule 60
( b) ( 4) for the Court's consideration "when, for any
cause, the summons in an action has not been personally '
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4 ( e) and
the defendant has failed to appear in said action."
But Rule 60 (b) says the Court may not consider a
motion made under this section since it must be made
within three months after the judgement was entered.
The Rule puts the burden of making inquiry on the defendant. No inquiry was made. The defendant admits
he saw the summons the day it was served, February 20,
1968. The defendant's attorney was mailed a copy of the
judgement in April 1968, and the defendant himself ad·
mits in his affidavit that he learned of the judgement in
January 1969. Even if we excuse the defendant for the
apparent failure of his attorney to make contact, his 0\\11
admission makes it more than three months after learning
of the judgement until he files his motion to set the same
aside and almost 13 months after judgement was actually
taken.
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-Rule 6 ( b) says the District Court has no power to
ex ten d th e time limit provided by Rule 60 ( b) and the
Utah Supreme Court has also so stated. See Shaw v.
Pilcher, g Utah 2d 222, 241 P. 2d 949 where the
.said
that a motion based on the grounds enumerated is meffrctive if made three months after the decision from which
relief is sought." There the Court required the filing of a
new action and the paying of a filing fee and the service
of process if the judgement was to be attacked. If the
<lefedant is dilatory in preserving his rights, he should
have the burden of seeking the other party in his own
jurisdiction, and not compel him to again come over 500
miles with his witness to prove what he wanted to prove
when he first filed his complaint.
The decision in Shaw v. Pilcher, supra., is in agreement with the uniform rule in the Federal Courts from
which most of Rule 60(b) was taken. See 6 Moore's Federal Practice, p. 1837-1838, motion made after time limitation must be denied as a matter of law.
There is no comparable rule to 60 ( b) ( 4) in the
Federal Rules but it appears that this subsection was taken
from the California Civil Procedure. See Section 473a of
the California Rules of Civl Procedure.
The cases cited in California all hold that the motion
madP under this provision (i.e. where for any reason the
defendant is not personally served and he fails to appear)
must be made within one year as provided in the Califori 11a rule or the court is without jurisdiction to hear a motion to set aside the default. When the Utah Supreme
Court adopted the California rule the time limitation was
reclucrd to three months and it is submitted that it was
not intended to give the defaulting defendant any more
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time in view of the following decisions of the State of Cali.
fornia interpreting their rule: People v. Davis, 77 Pac,
651, and 77 Pac. 1132 (The court has no power to set aside
a judgement not void upon its face after the expiration of
one year.); People v. Wrin, 76 Pac. 646; People v. McAllis.
ter, 76 Pac. 1127; Washko v. Stewart, 112 P.2d 306; E. E.
Young v. Fernstrom, 79 P. 2d 1117; Macbeth v. Macbeth.
25 P. 2d l'l; Vaughn v. Pine Creek Tungeston Co., 26.5
Pac. 491.
In fact the rule in Californa seems to be that where
the defendant had actual notice that the suit had been
commenced and he did nothing but refer the matter to an
attorney, he cannot even ask that the default be set aside
within the one year period because of his laches. See
Hiltbrand v. Hiltbrand, (Calif.) 23 P. 2d 277; Pierson v.
Fischer, (Calif.) 280 P. 2d 491; and see the discussion of
the rule in Brockman v. Wagenbach, (Calif.) 313 P.2d 659
where the court did not find laches. The lower court did
not make a finding that the default judgement was void,
or that it had been satisfied, released or discharged, which
is necessary if there is to be no time limitaion of three
months as provided in Rule 60 ( b) ( 5) and ( 6). The
lower court did not find "any other reason" than the defect
in personal service of summons which is necessary to avoid
the three month time Imitation and proceed under Rule
60 (b) (7). Rule 60 (b) (7) requires a reason other than
the defect in personal service of summons or the other
reasons listed in Rule 60 ( b) ( 1) through ( 6) before it
can be used by the Court. See Bish's Sheet Metal Co. v.
Luras, 11 Utah 2d 357, 359 P. 2d 21.

POINT II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DIS
MISSING THE ACTION AFTER THE FILING OF A
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TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGE\!ENT WHERE THE DEFENDANT HAS FILED AN
ANSWEH WITHOUT ORDERING A TRIAL ON THE
OF THE ACTION.
Naturally plaintiff prefers a decison under point I
because under the precedents set in California it appears
that the District Court had no jursdiction to hear a motion
made under Rule 60 ( b) ( 4) after the expiration of the
period of three months after the judgement had been entered. But if the Court agrees with the District Court that
this Rule may be set aside on some equitable principle,
and holds that the trial court can disregard the time limitation notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 6(b ), then
plaintiff submits that the same equity should permit a trial
on the merits. The Court dismissed the matter under Rule
.55( c) and 60 ( b). Plaintiff has read and re-read these
rules and the decisions made thereunder, but has found
no authority for a trial court to dismiss an action on a
motion to set aside a default. Surely plaintiff is entitled
to his day in Court even though he is a non-resident. Perhapc; the District Court felt that because there was no
personal service of summons under Rule 4, the complaint
must be dismissed under Rule 4 ( b). But, if so, the Court
overlooked the fact that defendant filed an answer and
counterclaim on April 29, 1969 and no defense under Rule
4( b ) is raised in the answer.
And it is not clear whether the Court's dismissal is
with or without prejudice. Plaintiff should be entitled to
consideration for the results of his labor in drilling the well
for defendant and should be entitled to his day in court to
present his evidence proving such consideration where he
lias pr<>ved a prima facie case before the Court and obtain-
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ed a judgement, even if the Court should decide that Rule
60 ( b) ( 4) is not applicable to this situation.
Respectfully submitted,
Ted S. Perry
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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